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Abstract 
 
The relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and tendency to engage in ideomotor action 
was measured in 71 psychology undergraduates at Plymouth University. Each participant’s 
level of hypnotic suggestibility was measured with a series of suggestibility tests, and their 
tendency to engage in ideomotor action was measured with two computer-based tasks - an 
action planning task and an imitation task. It was found that participants were faster at 
ideomotor-compatible tasks, such as backward action-planning trials (t(59) = -3.1, p = .003) 
and congruent imitation trials (t(57) = -14.46, p < .001). It was also found that participants 
made more errors in non-ideomotor-compatible tasks, such as forward action-planning trials  
(t(59) = -3.28, p = .002) and incongruent imitation trials (t(57) = -6.75, p < .001). This 
suggests that people find it easier to engage in ideomotor action, as they responded faster 
and more accurately in ideomotor-compatible tasks. Furthermore, a pairwise correlation 
found a relationship between suggestibility and error rates in the imitation task (r = +.36, n = 
56, p = .007, two-tailed). Increased error rates in the imitation task could be a result of having 
fewer inhibitory thoughts. This would prevent the participant from overriding their automatic, 
ideomotor responses, leaving them vulnerable to suggestion, as they cannot override these 
either. This indicates that some people are more suggestible than others as they have fewer 
inhibitory thoughts. Implications for the development of tailored medicine and hypnotherapy 
are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Ideomotor theories were formulated as an explanation as to how intentions and goals 
can produce actions without conscious thought, as opposed to older theories of 
sensorimotor action, which claimed that humans are passive in the environment and 
merely respond to stimuli (Morsella, Bargh & Gollwitzer 2009). For example, you may 
have found yourself reaching for a light switch upon entering a dimly lit room, or 
shaking someone’s hand simply because they extended theirs. Actions to achieve 
goals, such as these, can be produced effortlessly, automatically and without 
thought. Individual differences are present, however, in the tendency to engage in 
ideomotor action, prompting questions as to how ideomotor action works. 
 
In 1852 British physiologist William Carpenter coined the term ideomotor action, in 
order to provide a mechanism whereby involuntary motor action could result from 
ideas (Spitz, 1997), however, it is Thomas Laycock, a member of the same research 
team, who is credited with the discovery of the mechanism (Tischener, 1929, as cited 
in Stock & Stock, 2004). Laycock (1845) utilised a physiological approach to 
psychology and his work revealed that the symptoms of rabies, such as convulsions, 
were not only involuntary and reflex-like, but could also be triggered by the mere idea 
of drinking water. This allowed Laycock to conclude that thoughts and ideas could 
have an effect on motor activity, in this case reflexes. Having said this, Laycock’s 
work is limited, as rabies patients have no voluntary control over their actions or 
behaviour, thus preventing Laycock’s theory to be applied to the general population 
or to voluntary actions, as in, actions for which one sets themself a goal to achieve 
(Stock & Stock, 2004). 
 
This limitation, however, was overcome by Carpenter (1852) who attempted to 
identify a psychological explanation for supposedly supernatural events, as occultism 
was popular at the time (Hyman, 1999, as cited in Stock & Stock, 2004). Carpenter 
theorised that those who participated in séances were in a form of hypnotic state. He 
explained that, in this state, the participant’s will was suspended as a consequence 
of interfering with the cognitive processes that govern it. This allows the participant to 
be influenced and directed by ideas suggested to them, causing them to perform 
actions without being aware of doing them, almost reflexively. Carpenter’s 
observations suggest that when the will (ideas) is suspended, voluntary actions 
cannot be made, as access to cognitive processes has been prevented.  
 
Furthermore, in hypnotic states, this prevention of access to cognitive processes 
means inhibitory ideas are unavailable, meaning given suggestions face no opposing 
thoughts. Subsequently, Carpenter (1852) created the term ideomotor as motor 
activity derived from ideas. This was supported by other researchers of the time, 
such as Faraday (1853), who was also attempting to find alternative explanations for 
paranormal events. Faraday’s observations involved the phenomenon of table 
turning, and also led him to conclude that the mere suggestion that the table may 
turn in a particular direction was enough to create such an event. Faraday concluded 
that ideas and suggestions caused the participant’s attention to be directed at 
achieving the outcome of that suggestion unconsciously.   
 
Together these works imply that suggestions and ideas are enough to trigger motor 
responses, other scholars, however, were more interested in understanding the link 
between mind and body that could enable such a mechanism (Stock & Stock, 2004). 
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Lotze (1852, as cited in Stock & Stock, 2004) supported the notion that ideas could 
trigger actions but questioned as to what mechanism could provide such a function, 
as humans have no conscious control over the nerves and tendons that allow motor 
activity. Lotze theorised that such a mechanism must be the result of learning from 
day one of infancy, allowing the mind to associate movements and the resulting 
sensations. Once such an association has been made, the mind only has to desire a 
particular sensation or state for the movement associated with that state to occur. 
This theory, however, requires a bidirectional relationship to exist between 
movements and sensations, in order for voluntary action to occur. 
  
To overcome this, Harless (1861, as cited in Stock & Stock, 2004) developed a 
model to explain how motor activity and sensations could become associated and 
thus create a bidirectional relationship. Harless theorised that movements produce 
sensations, which in turn create sensory images of that movement. These sensory 
images are linked to motor elements in the brain and spinal cord and are 
strengthened through repetition, until the sensory image without the motor element is 
enough to produce the desired movement. Further repetition of the movement means 
that smaller excitations of the sensory elements are needed to trigger the same 
movements.  
 
William James (1890) integrated Harless’ model (1861) with Carpenter’s (1852) 
earlier occultism work, to further develop ideomotor theory. James agreed with 
Carpenter that an idea or a suggestion could result in motor activity, yet he disagreed 
that this was exclusive to the hypnotic states Carpenter had referred to. Instead, in 
accordance with Harless’ model explaining how motor actions and ideas could 
become associated, James proposed that all learned actions could be ideomotor 
actions, explaining that a goal or idea was enough to produce a sensory image, and 
thus result in an action (Stock & Stock, 2004).  
 
Evidence to support James’ (1890) theory of ideomotor action comes from Elsner 
and Hommel (2001), who conducted a series of experiments seeking to find this 
bidirectional relationship between the motor and sensory cortices. Their studies 
tested the notion that repeated co-occurrences of self-executed motor actions and a 
sensory event could create an association between them. The first part of the study 
was a learning phase, in which pressing the left key produced a low-pitched tone, 
whilst pressing the right key produced a high-pitched tone. After this, participants 
entered a test phase where the tones from the previous phase would be played to 
them. Participants were free to choose which key to respond with, but Elsner and 
Hommel (2001) found that participants were faster and more likely to choose a 
response that matched the sensory effect (tone) from the learning phase, pointing 
towards the conclusion that a bidirectional association between motor and sensory 
cortices does exist. Further support for a bidirectional relationship between the motor 
and sensory cortices comes from a study by Guillot, Lebon, Rouffet, Champely, 
Doyon and Collet (2007), who measured EMG activity in muscles for real and 
imagined actions. They found there was a significant increase in activity in the 
muscles involved in the imagined action, despite no actual movement occurring. As 
imagining an action resulted in activity in the muscles, it can be concluded that a 
bidirectional relationship may exist between motor and sensory cortices, thus 
supporting the theories of James’ (1890), Lotze (1852) and Harless’ (1862). 
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James (1890) developed ideomotor theory further by explaining why not all ideas, 
thoughts or suggestions result in motor activity being executed. James posited that 
an action would only be performed if it did not meet an inhibitory idea, which would 
prevent the action from being carried out. This builds upon Carpenter’s (1852) earlier 
work, which found that when the participant’s will was suspended – preventing 
processes which determine the will from functioning - people were more likely to 
engage in ideomotor action. James (1890) added that individual differences are also 
present, meaning that those who have fewer inhibitory thoughts are more likely to 
engage in ideomotor action and respond to suggestions. 
 
This could also explain why some people are more susceptible to hypnotic 
suggestions than others, as Eysenck (1943) stated that suggestions, such as 
ideomotor suggestions (that prompt actions), are closely related to hypnosis. 
Eysenck conducted a suggestibility test, known as the Body Sway test, in which 
participants must stand with their eyes closed whilst being told they are falling either 
forward or backwards. He found that introducing the idea of falling, to some 
participants, led to them falling forward almost immediately, yet this could be 
prevented if inhibitory thoughts were made – supporting ideomotor theory that ideas 
in the mind can be translated into action. Eysenck (1943) concluded that people who 
responded to suggestibility tests were also more easily induced into hypnotic states, 
whereas those who didn’t respond to suggestibility tests were not induced into 
hypnotic states. This built upon work by McDougall (1908, as cited in Eysenck, 
1943), who theorised that hypnosis restricted consciousness, forcing processes to 
use a restricted number of channels and resources, impairing one’s ability to use 
inhibitory processes, therefore heightening suggestibility (Eysenck, 1943).  
 
This theory has subsequently been supported by other psychologists, such as 
Spiegel (1995), who stated that hypnotic states restricted the processing of thoughts 
and motor processes, and by Baernstein (1929). Baernstein demonstrated the role of 
individual differences in suggestibility with an experiment in which participants were 
given a drug that inhibits higher brain activity. Baernstein found that inhibiting higher 
brain activity made suggestible participants more suggestible, but did not have any 
effect on participant’s who had previously not been suggestible. This study suggests 
that people become more suggestible when their ability to inhibit thoughts was 
removed, supporting earlier research from Carpenter (1852) and James (1890). The 
drug had no effect on the participant’s who were not suggestible because, as they 
had no tendency to engage in ideomotor action, they did not require inhibitory 
processes to prevent them from carrying out suggested actions. 
 
This evidence prompted further questions as, if mere suggestions were enough to 
trigger motor responses, then perceiving an action or the consequences of an 
outcome should also produce such a response. Subsequently, Greenwald (1970) 
demonstrated that if an event, such as a red flash of light, has been learned to follow 
a particular action, such as pressing a response key, then the red flash of light will 
prompt the execution of that action as a consequence. This suggests that the 
perception of an action is able to prompt an action response in the observer.  
 
In order to test this Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger and Prinz (2000) conducted a 
series of experiments in which participants had to execute a finger gesture whilst 
observing either the same or a different finger gesture on a computer screen. Brass 
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et al. (2000) found that participants were much faster at executing the expected 
(correct) gesture when it was congruent with the gesture performed by the on screen 
hand, supporting the notion that perceiving an action primes the execution of this 
action in the observer. Furthermore, they also found that error rates increased when 
the on screen hand was incongruent to the participant’s expected response, 
suggesting that the gesture performed by the on screen hand was interfering with the 
participant’s response. 
 
For the present research, participants undertook a suggestibility test and two 
ideomotor action tasks, in the form of an action planning task and an imitation task, 
derived from Brass et al.’s (2000) research, both of which recorded response times 
and error rates. The action-planning task tested an individual’s propensity to engage 
in ideomotor action by requiring them to respond to everyday scenarios. These would 
be presented as either ideomotor-compatible scenarios (backward action) or non-
ideomotor-compatible scenarios (forward action). Ideomotor scenarios required the 
participant to work from a goal (outcome) to an action, and determine whether the 
given action would produce this goal or not. Whereas, for the non-ideomotor 
scenarios, they were to work from an action to a goal (outcome) and determine 
whether or not this outcome follows from the action. It’s predicted that those who 
tend to engage in ideomotor action will complete the backward action scenarios 
faster, but will make more errors in the forward action scenarios.  
 
The imitation task, derived from Brass et al.’s (2000) earlier work, which found 
perceiving actions triggered the relative ideomotor action response, was the second 
task to measure propensity to engage in ideomotor action. This task presented an 
image of a hand on screen, which was matched to the participant in terms of gender 
and handedness, and would elicit a movement in the form of a finger raise. It’s 
expected that those who tend to engage in ideomotor action will respond faster on 
ideomotor-compatible trials (where image and instruction match), but will make more 
errors in the non-ideomotor-compatible trials (where image and instruction don’t 
match), as they will be unable to inhibit their automatic ideomotor response. 
 
As previously mentioned, Eysenck (1943) stated that ideomotor suggestions are 
similar to hypnosis and James (1890) proposed that people were more likely to 
engage in ideomotor action whilst in hypnotic states, as their will was suspended, 
preventing inhibitory thoughts. Subsequently, it’s expected that there will be a 
relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and likelihood to engage in ideomotor 
action. This will be demonstrated by participants who are more suggestible scoring 
faster response times and fewer errors in ideomotor-compatible tasks, due to having 
less inhibitory thoughts to oppose the suggestions, and scoring slower times and 
more errors in the non-ideomotor-compatible tasks. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seventy-one (50 female, 21 male) psychology undergraduates from Plymouth 
University participated in this study, as required by a compulsory research methods 
module. Participants would be required to listen to hypnotherapy, look at stimuli and 
respond with their right hand. As a result, exclusion criteria for this study meant only 
right-handed people could participate, who had corrected to normal hearing and 
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vision and full motor control in their right hand. 
 
Materials 
Instructions for the imitation and action planning tasks were provided on screen, 
since they were both computer-based tasks. The computer used for these tasks was 
a Viglen Genie S2 with a Windows 7 operating system and a Philips Brilliance 21.5” 
LED 221P3LPYES P-line monitor, with a Logitech K120 keyboard for input. Both 
these tasks and the suggestibility test were run using a stimulus delivery program 
called Presentation (version 16.3). 
 
The instructions for the suggestibility tests were provided in the form of an MP3 
format recording of a trained hypnotherapist, which was played to participants via the 
program Presentation and delivered with Unitone HD 3030 headphones. Participant’s 
responses were video recorded with Canon HD Legria HF20 E cameras and 
interpreted using printed hypnotic suggestibility rating scales based on the Harvard 
Group Test for Hypnotic Suggestibility (Shor & Orne, 1962). The suggestibility test 
rated participants on four tasks: eye closure, hand raise, head drop and a books and 
balloons measure. 
 
Design and Procedure 
This study used a within subjects design, in which all participants were given the 
same tasks in the same order. Upon arrival, participants were allocated a private 
booth and sat at a computer. Here they were given a brief, which detailed the study, 
provided instructions and reminded them of their right to withdraw and that all data 
collected would be anonymous and confidential. The experiment would only begin 
once they had read and agreed to the brief and then signed the consent form. 
 
The first part of the experiment was a computer-based task, testing whether there 
was a difference in response times and error rates for forward or backward 
(ideomotor-compatible) action-planning. This task employed an ABAB design, in 
which participants would be given four practice trials, before going on to complete 20 
trials of forward action-planning scenarios, followed by 20 trials of backward action-
planning scenarios and then this cycle would be repeated. In forward action-planning 
trials, a fixation cross would be displayed on screen for 500ms, which was then 
followed by a black screen for 500ms. Next participants were shown a scenario, such 
as “you are in a car” for 1200ms, then an action, such as “you push the accelerator” 
or “you push the brake” for 1200ms and then an outcome, such as “you will go faster” 
for 2600ms or until the participant responded. The participant was to decide whether 
or not the given outcome could be a result of executing the given action. To respond, 
participants would press the ‘J’ key with the index finger of their right hand if they 
thought it did follow, or the ‘K’ key with the middle finger of their right hand if they 
thought it did not follow. 
 
In the backward action-planning (ideomotor-compatible) trials the fixation cross and 
black screen were shown again in the same way. Then participants were shown a 
scenario, such as “you are in a car” for 1200ms, then a goal, such as “you want to go 
faster” for 1200ms and then an action, such as “you push the accelerator” or “you 
push the brake” for 2600ms or until the participant responded. This time the 
participant was to decide whether or not the given action would result in the given 
goal and would respond in the same manner as the forward action planning trials. 
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Both tasks recorded response times and error rates to determine whether a 
participant had a preference for forward or backward (ideomotor) action-planning. 
 
Once the action-planning task was complete, participants’ levels of suggestibility 
would be measured using tests from a recording of a hypnotherapist. For this, 
participants were moved to sit at the back of the booth to give them more space, and 
were given headphones to wear. Once comfortable, the video cameras would be 
turned on and the recording would be started. The hypnotherapist would first relax 
the participant and then use suggestibility measures of eye closure, hand raising, 
head dropping and a books and balloons task. 
 
The first suggestibility test measured eye closure, with a simple yes or no criteria, 
and was conducted by encouraging the participant to relax and suggesting that they 
would like to close their eyes, as they were getting heavy and tired. 
 
The second suggestibility test was a hand raise measure, which used an eight-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 0 (no response) to 7 (extreme response). In this test, the 
participant was told to focus on their non-dominant hand, which should be resting on 
their thigh. They were told to raise the palm of their hand, leaving just their fingertips 
touching their thigh, it was then suggested that their hand was beginning to feel 
lighter and lift off their thigh. Participants’ responses were measured by comparing 
the change in angle and extent of hand raise, as a consequence of the suggestions. 
 
The third suggestibility test was a head drop measure, which used a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 0 (no response) to 4 (extreme response). Participants were 
instructed to relax and close their eyes, but to also sit up straight. Then, it was 
suggested that their head was beginning to feel heavy and would be much more 
comfortable if it were to fall forwards, dropping their chin to their chest. This time, 
participants’ responses to the suggestions were recorded by comparing the change 
in the angle and extent of head dropping. 
 
The final suggestibility task was a books and balloons test, which again utilised a 
five-point Likert scale. For this test the participants were instructed to hold their arms 
out in front of them, with their palms facing upwards. Then, they were to imagine a 
large, heavy book being placed in their left hand and that a large balloon had been 
tied to their right wrist. They were told to visualize the colour, size and shape of these 
objects and it was suggested that the book was heavy, weighing the arm down lower, 
whilst the balloon was making their arm feel lighter, lifting it higher. Participants’ 
responses to these suggestions were again measured by comparing the change in 
angle of and extent of movement in each arm. 
 
Once this test had been completed, the hypnotherapist would awaken the 
participants by instructing them to open their eyes and informing them that all normal 
sensations had returned. The researcher would then ensure the participant was 
happy to continue before beginning the final part of the study, which was a computer-
based imitation task, based on Brass et al.’s (2000) previous study which suggested 
that perceiving an action could trigger an ideomotor action response in the observer, 
resulting in imitation of the perceived action. 
 
For this task, participants were sat in front of the computer where they would read 
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instructions for the task ahead. Once started, the participant would need to 
continually depress the ‘<’ key with the index finger of their right hand and the ‘>’ key 
with the middle finger of their right hand. For each trial, gender-matched images of a 
right hand would appear on screen. The first image of a hand would not be 
performing an action (neutral) and would be shown for 800ms, this would be followed 
by an image of a hand performing an action, in which either the index or middle finger 
was raised, for 1200ms or until a response was made. Accompanying the action 
image would be a small number in a circle slightly above the hand, instructing the 
participant how to respond correctly. A number one meant the participant should 
raise their index finger off the ‘<’ key, whilst a number two meant they should raise 
their middle finger off the ‘>’ key. This instruction, however, would not always be 
congruent with the action performed by the image of the hand and participants would 
be given eight practice trials, before going on to complete 120 trials, randomly 
presented with equal numbers of congruent (ideomotor-compatible) and incongruent 
(non-ideomotor-compatible) trials. Again, response times and error rates were 
recorded in order to investigate whether or not participants were faster at congruent 
trials and how many errors were caused by incongruent trials. 
 
Once completed the participants were given a debrief, informing them again of their 
right to withdraw their data but also supplying them with contact information, should 
they have any questions or concerns about the study, particularly the hypnotherapy. 
 
The data was then entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, enabling the removal 
of participants who showed error rates of 20% or above, as this suggested they had 
not understood or paid full attention to the tasks. 
 
Four two-tailed repeated measures t-tests were then conducted on the participants’ 
scores for response times and percentage error rates between forward and backward 
action trials and between congruent and incongruent imitation trials. This was to 
determine whether there was a significant difference between these ideomotor-
compatible and non-ideomotor-compatible trials. 
 
Next, pairwise correlations were conducted; in order to test whether or not there was 
a relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and ideomotor action. To run these 
correlations, overall scores for response times and error rates in each task had to be 
calculated. To do this, action planning scores for response times and error rates in 
backward action trials (ideomotor-compatible) were subtracted from those in forward 
action trials. This was then repeated for the imitation task, with scores for response 
times and error rates in the congruent trials (ideomotor-compatible) being subtracted 
from those in the incongruent trials. As a result, if participants were faster and made 
fewer errors in the ideomotor-compatible trials, then this would result in a positive 
score for them, whereas, if they were faster at non-ideomotor-compatible tasks this 
would result in a negative score. These scores were then correlated with each 
participant’s suggestibility score, which was an average calculated from their 
responsiveness to each suggestibility test. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics revealing the mean scores and standard deviations for 
response times and percentage error rates for both the action-planning task and 
imitation task can be found below in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations for response times (s) and percentage error rates 
(%) in the action-planning task (n = 59) and imitation task (n = 57). 
 
 
The results in Table 1 show that participants were faster in the backward action 
planning trials than in the forward action planning trials. A two-tailed repeated 
measures t-test found this difference to be significant t(59) = -3.1, p = .003. It also 
shows that participants were faster in the congruent imitation trials than in the 
incongruent trials. A two-tailed repeated measures t-test found this difference to be 
significant also t(57) = -14.46, p < .001, which supports the results of Brass et al. 
(2000). 
 
Table 1 also displays results concerning percentage error rates for each task and 
shows that participants made more errors in the forward action planning trials than in 
the backward action trials. A two-tailed repeated measures t-test found this difference 
to be significant t(59) = -3.28, p = .002. Table 1 also shows that participants made 
more errors in the incongruent imitation trials than in the congruent trials and a two-
tailed repeated measures t-test found this difference to be significant  
t(57) = -6.75, p < .001, also corroborating Brass et al.’s (2000) earlier work. 
 
It was predicted that scores for response times and percentage error rates would be 
interrelated with hypnotic suggestibility. To test this separate, pairwise Pearson 
correlations were conducted.  
 
 
Table 2: Cross correlations of response times and error rates across tasks.  
(** = significant at .005) 
 
Measures r 
Suggestibility Score / Imitation RT -.16 
Suggestibility Score / Imitation Error .36 ** 
Suggestibility Score / Action Planning RT -.07 
Suggestibility Score / Action Planning Error .02 
Action Planning RT / Action planning Error -.14 
Action Planning RT / Imitation Error -0.6 
Action Planning Error / Imitation Error .07 
Action Planning Error / Imitation RT .01 
Imitation RT / Action Planning RT .20 
Imitation RT / Imitation Error -.20 
 
 
 
Response Times Percentage Error Rates 
 M SD M% SD% 
Backward Action 964.68 202.17 5.20 4.82 
Forward Action 994.61 213.95 7.15 5.06 
Congruent Imitation 391.14 74.13 2.90 3.79 
Incongruent Imitation 448.07 91.64 7.53 5.52 
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Table 2 shows that there was a positive correlation between suggestibility score and 
imitation score in error rates in the direction predicted, although, there are no other 
relationships. Figure 1 depicts a linear positive relationship between suggestibility 
score and error rates in the imitation task and a Pearson correlation revealed that this 
relationship was statistically significant, r = +.36, n = 56, p = .007, two-tailed, showing 
that more suggestible participants made more errors in the incongruent imitation 
trials. 
 
Figure 1: Scatterplot showing the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and error rates 
in the imitation task (n = 56). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
This study investigated the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
propensity to engage in ideomotor action. To do this, participants’ scores on a 
suggestibility measure were correlated with their scores for response times and error 
rates in two tasks designed to measure ideomotor action.  
 
The first hypothesis predicted that participants would score faster response times on 
ideomotor-compatible tasks, and would score higher error rates on non-ideomotor-
compatible tasks. Table 1 reveals that the results are consistent with the hypothesis, 
as participants were faster at the backward action planning trials and congruent 
imitation trials, whilst they made more errors in the forward action planning trials and 
incongruent imitation trials. Subsequent analysis found these differences to be highly 
significant, thus replicating previous work by Brass et al. (2000) who also found that 
participants were faster at ideomotor-compatible tasks, but more error prone on non-
ideomotor-compatible tasks.  
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Brass et al. (2000) concluded that these observations were a result of an interference 
effect, whereby the perception of an action (the finger movement) is enough to 
influence the response a participant will give, which also supports Greenwald’s 
(1970) previous research. This results in higher error rates in the incongruent 
imitation trials, as an ideomotor action response is executed upon perceiving the 
action, producing a response that is incorrect to the given numerical instruction. 
Consequently, it could be suggested that a similar mechanism is at work for the 
action-planning task. Here, it was found that participants made significantly fewer 
errors in the backward action (ideomotor-compatible) trials, and could be due to the 
goal or outcome being presented first, which primes the participants towards the 
correct response. Furthermore, as participants were faster and made fewer errors in 
ideomotor-compatible tasks, it can be concluded that these observations are due to 
the tasks themselves and not the result of a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
The results also show that a significant correlation was found between hypnotic 
suggestibility and percentage error rates in the imitation task (Figure 1), which is in 
line with the prediction that there would be a relationship between suggestibility and 
ideomotor action. This signifies that participants who are more suggestible committed 
more errors in the incongruent imitation trials than less suggestible participants did. 
This is to be expected, as theories by James (1890) and Eysenck (1943) posited that 
those who are more suggestible have less inhibitory thoughts to prevent ideomotor 
action and that access to these is prevented when in hypnotic states.  
 
Consequently, highly suggestible participants are unable to override and prevent the 
automatic execution of an ideomotor action in response to the perceived movement 
image, resulting in the incorrect response being given. This result, therefore, provides 
evidence for the theory that people who are more suggestible tend to engage in 
ideomotor action more so than less suggestible people, as they are unable to inhibit 
ideomotor processes. Thus, this research has established a link between hypnosis 
and ideomotor action and in doing so has provided support for the theories of James 
(1890), Eysenck (1943) and Greenwald (1970). 
 
Having said this, no further significant relationships between suggestibility and 
ideomotor action were found, which partially goes against the hypothesis, as the 
action-planning test of ideomotor action appears to have had no relationship with 
suggestibility. However, this could simply mean that the action-planning task was not 
as good a measure of ideomotor action as thought. The action-planning task required 
participants to read and understand scenarios in order to make judgments based 
upon them, therefore requiring higher-level cognitive processes than the imitation 
task. Perhaps if this task was operationalised differently, such as a in the form of a 
pictorial version, then it would reduce the need for higher-level processes, thus 
making it easier to process and increase its suitability as a measure of ideomotor 
action. 
 
There was, however, a negative correlation between suggestibility score and 
response times in both the imitation and action planning tasks. Although this was not 
significant, it was in the expected direction, as those who are less suggestible should 
have slower response times. This could be, according to James (1890), because 
they are able to prevent their ideomotor response and select a different response 
instead, which slows down their response. Therefore, it is surprising this result did 
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not reach significance, however, it is possible to verify this result by replicating the 
study with a larger sample. 
 
This study has added to the understanding of hypnosis, as error rates were 
significantly correlated with suggestibility. This indicates that suggestible people have 
less inhibitory thoughts, which is why they are unable to stop the execution of an 
ideomotor action and as a result make an incorrect response. This data, however, is 
correlational not causational, meaning that increased suggestibility does not 
necessarily cause increased ideomotor action (as a result of fewer inhibitory 
thoughts). Furthermore, the direction of the relationship cannot be determined, thus 
one cannot be certain whether it is suggestibility that influences ideomotor action or 
whether it is ideomotor action that influences suggestibility. This could be tested in an 
experiment in which the suggestibility levels of participants could be measured before 
and after a training phase encouraging participants to use ideomotor action more 
frequently. If after the training phase they show an increased level of suggestibility, 
then it could be concluded that a tendency to engage in ideomotor action heightens 
suggestibility.  
 
A better understanding of the mechanism behind hypnosis could have broad 
applications, specifically in terms of hypnotherapy as a treatment. For example, 
recent advancements in gene mapping and DNA sequencing have paved the way for 
personalised medicine (Ginsburg & McCarthy, 2001). That is to say, soon clinicians 
could treat patients on a case-by-case basis, and choose treatments tailored to work 
more effectively for them. The current study suggests that there is a relationship 
between suggestibility and ideomotor action as a result of fewer inhibitory thoughts. 
Thus, hypnotherapy may be more effective for patients with fewer inhibitory thoughts, 
as it should be easier to induce hypnotic states. Consequently, in future, a patients’ 
suggestibility level could be measured, which would assess the suitability of 
hypnotherapy as a treatment for the patient.  
 
For example, Hasan et al. (2014) conducted a study comparing the effectiveness of 
hypnotherapy and nicotine replacement therapies at reducing smoking. They found 
that hypnotherapy patients were more than three times as likely to have abstained 
from smoking 26 weeks later than those who used nicotine replacement alone. This 
has huge implications for public health and the effectiveness of hypnotherapy as a 
treatment, but furthermore, could be even more effective for patients who are highly 
suggestible. Having said this, even if the patient is not highly suggestible, other 
studies, such as Schweiger Gallo, Pfau, and Gollwitzer (2012), have shown it is 
possible to train people to become more suggestible. Perhaps if patients were taught 
to reduce their inhibitory thoughts and to increase their tendency to engage in 
ideomotor action, they may become more suggestible and more responsive to the 
hypnotherapy. 
 
To conclude, the current study has, in the main, provided evidence to support the 
hypothesis that a relationship between suggestibility and ideomotor action exists, as 
participants that were more suggestible accrued higher error rates in the incongruent 
imitation trials. This indicates that more suggestible participants are less able to 
prevent ideomotor responses, as a result of having fewer inhibitory thoughts. These 
findings have raised further research questions, such as the directionality of this 
relationship and how exactly suggestibility affects ideomotor action and vice versa. In 
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addition to this, these findings could also be applied to hypnotherapy, specifically in 
terms of investigating the role of ideomotor action prevalence on suggestibility, which 
could lead to more effective, patient specific treatments. 
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